Mental time travel in dysphoria: Differences in the content and subjective experience of past and future episodes by Anderson, Rachel J.. & Evans, Gemma L..
Running Head: DYSPHORIA & EPISODIC THOUGHT 1 
Mental time travel in dysphoria: Differences in the content and subjective experience 
of past and future episodes 
Rachel J. Anderson & Gemma L. Evans
University of Hull 
Author Note 
Rachel J. Anderson and Gemma L. Evans, Department of Psychology, 
University of Hull, UK. 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Rachel J. 
Anderson, Department of Psychology, University of Hull, Cottingham Road, Hull, 
HU6 7RX, UK. Email: Rachel.Anderson@hull.ac.uk 
*Manuscript
Click here to view linked References
© 2016, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Running Head: DYSPHORIA & EPISODIC THOUGHT  2 
Abstract 
Previous research has shown that depressed individuals demonstrate a number of 
biases in their ability to retrieve past events and simulate future events. The current 
study investigated the content and phenomenological experience of past and future 
events in dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals.  Results indicated that dysphoric, 
compared with non-dysphoric, individuals reported fewer positive events across both 
temporal directions.  Furthermore, phenomenological characteristics ratings suggested 
that dysphoric individuals saw future, but not past, events as less vivid, coherent, 
sensorially detailed, bodily experienced, emotionally intense and important with 
respect to their life story and identity. These findings are discussed with reference to 
theories regarding the functions of ‘mental time travel’, in particular how the muted 
subjective experience of future episodes in depression may impair future planning, 
problem-solving and self regulation.  
Keywords: depression; mental time travel; episodic thinking; autobiographical 
memory; phenomenology  
© 2016, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Running Head: DYSPHORIA & EPISODIC THOUGHT  3 
Mental time travel in dysphoria: Differences in the content and subjective experience 
of past and future episodes 
1. Introduction 
Cognitive theories of depression (e.g. Beck, 1987) place emphasis on biases in 
thinking, with a triad of negativity centered on the self, the world, and the future. One 
area of cognition within which this model has been investigated is autobiographical 
thinking,  which  includes  both  the  individual’s  concept  of  the  self  and  their  
interpretation of events that have, or might yet, happen within their lives. 
Autobiographical thinking incorporates the ability  to  vividly  mentally  ‘time  travel’  
into both one’s  personal  past and future. These processes require an individual to 
recall and manipulate episodic information held within autobiographical memory to 
reconstruct past experiences or simulate potential future experiences.  
Depressed individuals have been shown to demonstrate biases in the extent to 
which they can successfully retrieve and simulate specific events (lasting less than 
one day and containing episodic information). Individuals with clinical depression 
evidence difficulty detailing specific memories, instead providing more general, 
categoric, descriptions (Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams & Scott, 1988).  Such 
overgeneral thinking is evident for both past and future events and extends to non-
clinical depression (e.g. Dickson & Bates, 2006; Williams et al., 1996). Williams and 
colleagues’  (Williams, 2006; Williams et al., 2007) Car-FA-X model suggests three 
cognitive mechanisms that may each individually, or in combination, lead an 
individual to engage in overgeneral thought. Research has suggested that retrieval of 
specific memories often involves supervisory executive processes (e.g. Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), thus a truncated search within the retrieval process may result 
from reduced executive capacity (X).  Furthermore, retrieval cues may capture 
attention and engage ruminative thought processes (Car). Finally, overgeneral 
thinking may also constitutes a form of functional avoidance (FA) that aims to 
regulate emotion. Arguably, however, in the long term overgenerality represents a 
maladaptive thinking style that impairs problem-solving because the individual 
struggles to access specific experiences that can be used as analogies (Williams, 
2006).  This, in turn, may predispose an individual to emotional distress, a notion 
supported by findings that reduced recall specificity and poor problem-solving act as 
vulnerability factors for future depressive symptoms (e.g. Anderson, Goddard, & 
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Powell, 2010, 2011). 
Evidence also suggests that even when individuals with depression are able to 
generate specific past and/or future events then further biases are present within the 
content of such events.  This is particular pertinent with respect to the emotional 
valence of events. For instance, they demonstrate a negativity bias within 
autobiographical memory, with a reversal of the usual tendency to retrieve positive 
events more rapidly than negative events (e.g. Lloyd & Lishman, 1975). In an 
investigation of future episodic thinking, MacLeod, Tata, Kentish and Jacobsen 
(1997) evidenced reduced fluency in the simulation of positive, but not negative, 
events.  Other work suggests that depression disrupts the fading affect bias, where the 
usual pattern is for affective fading to be quicker for negative, compared with 
positive, past events (Walker, Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Thompson, 2003).  
Such biases, arguably, serve to maintain depressed mood by validating negative self-
beliefs.   
In addition to studying the content and specificity of events, researchers have also 
become interested in how individuals’  subjectively  experience  their memories and 
simulations. Episodes, both past and future, can take a number of forms within the 
mind’s eye.  For instance, they can vary in how vividly they are perceived, the extent 
to which they involve sensory detail and the extent to which the order of events within 
them are coherent and ordered.  Tulving (1985) argued that for a truly episodic 
experience then the individual needs to be able to mentally place themselves within 
the past or future episode, a process he termed autonoetic consciousness.  
Experimental assessments of autonoetic consciousness in the recall of past events 
have used the remember/know procedure, whereby participants report whether they 
recollect subjective experiences from the encoding context (remember) or not (know) 
(e.g. Piolino et al., 2003). An alternative method, which can be used to assess the 
extent of autonoetic consciousness for both past and future events, requires 
participants to provide subjective ratings of phenomenological experience.  Evidence 
suggests that subjectively experienced phenomenological characteristics differ 
according to both the event’s  temporal direction and distance from the present (e.g. 
Berntsen  &  Bohn,  2010;;  D’Argembeau  &  van  der  Linden,  2004). This work has 
demonstrated that people experience past events more vividly and with greater 
sensory detail than future events, yet rate future events as being more positive and 
pertinent to their sense of identity and life story. Furthermore, these studies show that 
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distant, compared with near, events are experienced in significantly less sensory 
detail, yet are paradoxically rated as more related to the self-narrative. Temporal 
construal theory suggests that distant events consist of high-level construals which are 
represented in abstract and de-contextualised details, whereas near events are low-
level construals, represented in concrete and contextualised details (Trope & 
Liberman, 2003). 
Thus, in addition to the biases in content and specificity already outlined, the 
degree of autonoetic consciousness accompanying autobiographical memories and 
future thoughts constitutes a further area in which individuals with depression may 
experience biases. Using the remember/know procedure, Lemogne et al. (2006) found 
that depressed participants demonstrated an impairment in both specificity and 
autonoetic consciousness for recall of past events. Relative to controls, depressed 
patients reported fewer remember responses for positive, but not negative, events.    
Other research has made use of phenomenological characteristics ratings to explore 
levels of autonoetic consciousness associated with both past and future events in 
depression. Work investigating memories and simulations generated voluntarily, in 
response to emotional cues, suggests that both clinical and non-clinical depression are 
associated with lower vividness ratings for positive, but not negative, events (e.g. 
Holmes, Lang, Moulds, & Steele, 2008; Morina, Deeprose, Pusowski, Schmid, & 
Holmes, 2011; Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2011). Arguably, these biases might serve 
to maintain depression through blunted processing of positively-valenced emotional 
stimuli (Holmes et al., 2008). 
A large proportion of the previous work examining autobiographical memories 
and simulations within depression has focused on voluntary recall/simulation directed 
by emotional cues, with comparisons drawn between events produced in response to 
positive versus negative cues.  This method has proved useful in highlighting a 
specific difficulty with positive cognitions for individuals with depression (e.g. 
Holmes et al., 2008; Morina et al., 2011). However, the extent to which it reflects 
retrieval and simulation strategies in real life can be questioned. There are few 
occasions when individuals are required to recall/simulate with an explicitly positive 
or negative cue. Instead they look backwards and forwards in time and select events, 
as they come to mind, in response to a myriad of cue types, such as lifetime periods 
and environmental or contextual cues. The type of cue used to elicit memories and 
simulations may impact on the events retrieved and how the individual subjectively 
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experiences them.  For instance, one study using a diary methodology to compare the 
reactions of depressed and non-depressed individuals to memories, recalled both 
voluntarily and involuntarily, failed to find a difference in perceived vividness of 
events between the two groups. The depressed participants did, however, have 
stronger emotional reactions to memories and rated them as more important to their 
life story (Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, & Watkins, 2012).  Furthermore, research 
investigating involuntary memories, which by definition are not cued by the 
experimenter, have evidenced different results to the studies investigating voluntary 
recall. For instance, they have shown that involuntary recall does not evidence the 
same overgenerality in depression (Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, & Watkins, 2013) and 
that involuntarily retrieved, intrusive, memories are characterised by higher levels of 
vividness in depressed, compared with recovered depressed and non-depressed, 
individuals (Newby & Moulds, 2011). These findings add further weight to the 
argument that the type of cues used to elicit retrieval and/or simulation impacts on the 
observed effects.   
Recent work by Young, Erickson and Drevents (2012) has also suggested that the 
emotional valence of retrieved memories might be independent of the valence of the 
retrieval cue. In their study, depressed participants produced significantly fewer 
positive memories in response to positive cue words than the non-depressed 
comparison group. Much of the previous work using emotional cues has held the 
inherent  assumption  that  the  valence  of  the  cue  will  correspond  with  participants’  
subjective rating of emotional valence, thus the findings of Young et al. presents a 
further limitation of the use of emotional cues for retrieval/simulation of 
autobiographical events. Therefore, one key aim of the current study was to explore 
both the content and subjective experience of episodic thinking in depression when 
the constraints of explicitly emotional cues are removed. In order to achieve this, 
participants were simply asked to generate past and future events from near and 
distant time periods. This method of cueing was chosen for two reasons. Firstly it is 
minimalist in the extent to which it directs participants towards any particular type, or 
valence, of event. Secondly it represents a strategy, whereby lifetime periods serve as 
cues, that individuals might realistically employ when retrieving and simulating 
events in real life.   
A further aim of the present investigation was to directly compare the content, and 
subjective experience, of past and future episodes in depression within the same 
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study. It is of interest to compare past and future thinking in depression because, 
whilst the notion of a unified mental time travel system is supported by evidenced 
similarities between the two processes, it cannot be automatically assumed that biases 
in autobiographical memory will necessarily be present, or of the same nature, within 
future thinking.  This argument is supported by Dalgleish, Hill, Golden, Morant, and 
Dunn (2011) who investigated the structure of past and future life stories in 
depression.  Participants generated meaningful themes (life chapters) for both their 
personal past and future, and were given a range of positive and negative attributes to 
assign to the chapters they generated. Current and remitted depressives exhibited a 
depressogenic structuring, with more negative and less positive attributes used with 
respect to their past, but not future, life story. Furthermore, as previously discussed, 
work with healthy adults has suggested that the subjective experience of past and 
future events often differs (e.g.  Berntsen  &  Bohn,  2010;;  D’Argembeau  &  van  der  
Linden, 2004; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013). Rasmussen and Berntsen (2013) argue 
that such differences may reflect the fact that past and future episodic thinking serve 
different functions. For instance, the fact that future, compared with past, events are 
rated more positively and as more important with respect to life story and identity 
suggests that future simulations are more pertinent for maintenance of a positive self 
image and self-regulation than memories. Therefore, investigating the comparative 
content, and subjective experience, of autobiographical past and future events may 
provide a more holistic view of how individuals with depression view, and make use 
of, their personal life story.    
Thus, the current study investigated the content and subjective experience of past 
and future episodic events in individuals exhibiting high levels of depressive 
symptoms (dysphoria) compared with a group of non-dysphoric controls. It is 
hypothesised that the emotional valence of events, as evidenced by independent 
coding  of  the  events’  content  and  subjective  ratings  of  valence, will differ between the 
mood groups. Dysphoric individuals will report fewer positive, and more negative, 
events compared with controls. It is also hypothesised, in line with previous research, 
that future events will be more positive than past events.  It is currently difficult to 
hypothesise whether this positivity bias for future events will emerge within both 
mood groups.  Research demonstrating that depressed individuals have a particular 
difficulty with positive future cognitions (e.g. Holmes et al., 2008) suggests that the 
future positivity bias may not be evident in the dysphoric sample. Conversely, work 
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by Dalgleish et al (2011) found that the depressogenic structuring of past experiences 
did  not  extend  to  depressed  individuals’  future  life  stories.  Thus, dysphoric 
individuals may still view the future more positively than the past.  
The ratings of phenomenological characteristics used within the present 
investigation can be separated into two categories.  In addition to the rating of 
emotional valence described above, five of the remaining characteristics ratings relate 
to the extent and nature of (p)reliving, whilst two reflect the importance of events in 
terms of self-concept.    It is hypothesised that, within the control group at least, we 
will witness a pattern of findings in line with the previous literature (e.g. Berntsen & 
Bohn,  2010;;  D’Argembeau  &  van  der  Linden,  2004).  Past, compared with future, and 
temporally near, compared with distant, events will receive higher ratings for all of 
the variables relating to the extent and nature of (p)reliving and lower ratings for the 
two variables assessing importance for self-concept.  With respect to the dysphoric vs. 
control comparisons, it is hypothesised that the depressive biases in vividness of 
events seen in previous work (e.g. Holmes et al., 2008; Morina et al., 2011; Stöber, 
2000; Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2011) will pervade across all of the variables 
assessing the extent and nature of (p)reliving. Thus, dysphoric participants will report 
past and future events that are less vivid, coherent (has a clear order of events and 
tells a coherent story), rich in sensory detail and emotionally intense. With respect to 
the ratings of importance for self-concept, it is hypothesised that the dysphoric, 
compared with the control, group will rate past events as being more important with 
respect to life story and identity. This prediction is grounded within work showing 
heightened importance ratings for memories within clinical groups (Rubin, Dennis, & 
Beckham, 2011; Watson et al., 2012). As yet, little is known about the role of future 
events in the self-concept of depressed/dysphoric individuals.  Therefore, it is difficult 
to predict how the dysphoric and control participants will compare on these variables 
in relation to future thinking. 
2. Method 
2.1. Design & Participants.  
A mixed 2*2*2 design was employed. Temporal direction (past vs. future) and 
temporal distance (near vs. distant) were manipulated within-subjects, and mood 
group (dysphoric vs. control) between-subjects.  31 participants (9 males), with a 
mean age of 22.48 years (SD = 3.89) met criteria for dysphoria; a cut-off of 16+ on 
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the Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale as indicated by Radloff 
(1977, 1991).  28 participants (11 males), with a mean age of 21.61 years (SD = 3.69) 
formed the non-dysphoric group. An independent samples t-test established a 
significant difference, t(38)= 12.09, p<.01, in CES-D scores between the dysphoric 
(M = 23.32, SD = 7.79) and non-dysphoric (M = 5.29, SD = 2.72) groups. The two 
mood groups did not differ with respect to age or gender ratio. All participants were 
recruited voluntarily, without payment or course credit, from the undergraduate 
population at the University of Hull.  No participants were currently receiving 
treatment for depression and/or anxiety. However, participants were not screened for 
previous mental health problems of current/past use of psychotropic drugs. 
2.2. Materials  
2.2.1. Past Events Task.   
Written instructions were provided which asked the participant to recall four 
past events; two that had occurred within the previous month and two over a year old. 
The order of the two time periods was counterbalanced across participants.  
Instructions stated that each event must have occurred on a single day and they were 
to think about it in as much detail as possible.  They were then asked to write a brief 
description of the event.  After recording each event, participants provided ratings for 
eight phenomenological characteristics (adapted from Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; 
D’Argembeau   &   Van   der   Linden,   2006) associated with the experience of 
remembering the event (emotional valence, emotional intensity, vividness, coherence, 
sensory detail, extent of bodily experience, relevance of the event for identity and 
importance for life story). All variables were assessed using 7-point Likert scales.  In 
order to allow events to be separated into those rated as negative (-3, -2 and -1), 
neutral (0), and positive (+1, +2 and +3), emotional valence ratings were provided on 
a scale ranging from -3 to +3. ‘The emotions I have when I recall/imagine the event 
are…   (-3,   …extremely   negative;;   +3,   …extremely   positive)’.         All   other  
phenomenological characteristics used a scale ranging from 1 to 7.  For example, ‘The  
order of events is clear and tells  a  coherent  story’  (1,  Not  at  all;;  7,  Extremely)’  and 
‘When   I   think   about   it   I   can   ‘bodily’   feel   myself   in   the   event   (1,   Not   at   all;;   7, 
Extremely)’. 
2.2.2. Future Events Task.   
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Identical in structure to the Past Events Task, each participant was asked to 
imagine, and provide associated phenomenological characteristics ratings, for four 
future events.  
2.2.3. CES-D Scale.  
 The CES-D is a self-report measure designed to assess depressive symptoms 
within nonclinical populations (Radloff, 1977). Each of 20 items is marked across a 4-
point Likert scale to indicate frequency of experience within the previous week. For 
example, ‘I  was  bothered  by  things  that  usually  don’t  bother  me’  (0= rarely or none 
of the time, 3=most or all of the time).  Scores range from 0-60 with higher scores 
indicating higher frequencies of symptoms. Radloff (1977, 1991) suggested that a cut-
off of 16+ is indicative of depression. A number of alternative cut-off scores have 
been suggested and used by various researchers, however a cut-off of 16+ remains the 
most consistently used within the literature.  
2.3. Procedure 
Participants were tested individually with the order of the Past Events Task and 
the Future Events Task counterbalanced across participants. All participants 
completed the CES-D scale at the end of the testing protocol.  
2.4. Statistics Analyses 
Data were analysed using SPSS Statistics 19. Analyses comprised a series of 
mixed factorial ANOVAs. In each case, we were interested in whether the dependent 
variable varied as a function of temporal direction (past vs. future), temporal distance 
(near vs. far), and mood group (dysphoric vs. control). As a first stage, we 
investigated the specificity of the events generated. Given that the task instructions 
had been to retrieve/simulate specific events, pertaining to a single day in the 
past/future, any events that did not meet these requirements were then removed from 
further analyses.  
Subsequent analyses were concerned with the valence of the events reported 
and the phenomenological characteristics associated with these events.  With respect 
to the phenomenological characteristics ratings, five variables assessed the extent of 
(p)reliving (emotional intensity, vividness, coherence, sensory detail and bodily 
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experience) and two assessed the event’s  importance  with  respect  to  life  story  and  
identity. It is acknowledged that there are issues inherent in conducting multiple 
comparisons to assess the extent of (p)reliving and event importance.  Thus, whilst no 
adjustments were made for the multiple ANOVAs assessing event (p)reliving and 
importance, two-tailed tests are reported throughout and significant results are 
interpreted cautiously.  
Any significant interaction effects that emerged from the omnibus ANOVAs 
were investigated using bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons.  
3. Results 
3.1. Specificity of Events 
 Events were categorised for specificity by two raters who were blind to the 
participants’  dysphoric  status.    Events were coded into one of three categories; 
specific (events lasting less than one day), categoric (repeated events, e.g. repeated 
trips to the cinema) and extended (single events lasting longer than one day, e.g. a 
holiday). Minimal disagreement occurred (Cohen’s  Kappa  =  .95)  and was resolved 
via discussion. All temporally close events were categorised as specific.  A small 
number of distant events referred to extended events; these comprised 3% and 7% of 
past, and 8% and 4% of future, events for the dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
participants respectively. A 2*2*2 ANOVA assessed specificity as a function of 
temporal direction, temporal distance, and mood group.  The main effect of temporal 
distance was significant, F(1,57)=14.99, p<.01, with distant, compared with near, 
events being less specific.  No other effects were significant (all ps > .34).  The 
extended events were removed from the dataset, leaving only specific events for 
further analyses. 
3.2. Content of Events 
 The same two independent raters coded the specific events into four categories 
with respect to event content (adapted  from  D’Argembeau  &  van  der  Linden,  2004); 
celebrations/leisure events; positive academic/work events; negative or neutral 
academic/work events; arguments, accidents, and deaths (Table 1).  The number of 
events outside these categories was small (reported as  ‘Other’  in Table 1).  Agreement 
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between  raters  was  high  (Cohen’s  Kappa  =  .93)  and  any  disagreements  were  resolved  
via discussion.  
 A 2*2*2*2 ANOVA assessed the proportion of events as a function of 
temporal direction, temporal distance, mood group and category valence.  The 
proportions of events in the two positive (celebrations/leisure events and positive 
academic/work events) and two negative (negative or neutral academic/work events 
and arguments, accidents & deaths) categories were summed to create aggregate 
proportions for positive and negative categories respectively.   The main effect of 
valence was significant, F(1,57)=328.13, p<.001;  overall, more positive than negative 
events were recalled/simulated. The analysis also revealed a significant main effect of 
mood group, F(1,57)=4.50, p<.05, and trends towards significance for the main 
effects of temporal direction, F(1,57)=3.74, p=.06, and temporal distance, 
F(1,57)=3.74, p=.06. This suggests that dysphoric participants generated a greater 
proportion of events that fitted into one of the four coding categories, rather than the 
‘Other’  category.  Furthermore,  events  were  more  likely to fall into one of these four 
categories when they were temporally near, compared with far, and in the future, 
compared with the past.  
 A number of two-way interactions were also significant or approaching 
significance. Both the temporal direction x valence, F(1,57)=35.80, p<.001, and 
temporal distance x valence, F(1,57)=13.02, p<.01, were significant.  Bonferroni 
adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that higher proportions of positive events 
were found for future, compared with past, events (p<.01) and far, compared with 
near, events (p<.01); conversely, higher proportions of negative events were found for 
past, compared with future, events (p<.01) and near, compared with far, events 
(p<.05). The mood group x valence interaction approached significance, 
F(1,57)=3.40, p=.07, with bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons demonstrating 
that the control and dysphoric participants did not differ with respect to the proportion 
of reported events categorised as positive (p=.27).  The dysphoric participants did, 
however, evidence a higher proportion of events categorised as negative (p<.05).  All 
other two-way, three-way and four-way interactions were not significant (all ps>.10). 
3.3. Subjective Valence of Events 
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The present study used a minimal cueing strategy that did not specify event 
valence.  Thus, the proportion of events rated as positive (+1, +2, +3), negative (-1, -
2, or -3) or neutral (0) could differ, particularly as a function of mood group. The 
proportion of events in each of these categories was calculated as a function of 
temporal direction, temporal distance, and mood group. (Table 1). Three separate 
2*2*2 ANOVAs assessed the proportion of positive, negative and neutral events 
independently.  
 For positive events, a main effect of temporal distance emerged, F(1,57)=4.41, 
p<.05, with the proportion of positive events being higher in the distant, compared 
with the near, condition.  A main effect of mood group also emerged, F(1,57)=16.57, 
p<.001, with a higher proportion of positive events being reported by the non-
dysphoric, compared with the dysphoric, participants. For neutral and negative events 
respectively, a significant main effect, F(1,57)=11.18, p<.01, and a trend towards 
significance, F(1,57)=3.08, p=.09, emerged with respect to mood group. A higher 
proportion of negative and neutral events were provided by dysphoric, compared with 
non-dysphoric, participants. All other main and interaction effects were not significant 
(all ps >.13). 
3.4. Phenomenological Characteristics Ratings – All Events 
A series of 2*2*2 mixed ANOVAS assessed the effect of temporal direction 
(past vs. future), temporal distance (near vs. far) and mood group (non-dysphoric vs. 
dysphoric) on the subjective experience ratings provided by participants. Six of the 
ratings provided related to the extent and nature of (p)reliving. Ratings of emotional 
valence were analysed in section 3.3, with the remaining five (vividness, sensory 
detail, coherence, and bodily experience) analysed here. Significant main effects of 
temporal direction emerged for all variables, whereby future, compared with past, 
events were rated as being less vivid, F(1,57)=66.58, p<.001; coherent, 
F(1,57)=64.48, p<.001, sensorially detailed, F(1,57)=27.01, p<.001, bodily 
experienced, F(1,57)=21.43; p<.001,and emotionally intense, F(1,57)=9.89, p<.01. 
Significant main effects of temporal distance also emerged across for all variables 
except emotional intensity, F(1,57)=2.76, p=.10, and bodily experience, F(1,57)=2.37, 
p=.13. Temporally distant, compared with temporally near, events were rated as being 
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less vivid, F(1,57)=29.80, p<.001, coherent, F(1,57)=24.84, p<.001 and sensorially 
detailed, F(1,57)=13.67, p<.001.  
No significant main effects of mood group emerged for ratings of coherence, 
sensory detail, bodily experience or emotional intensity (all ps>.28). A significant 
effect of mood group was evident for vividness of events, F(1,57)=5.79, p<.05, 
whereby dysphoric individuals, compared with non-dysphoric controls, reported 
lower vividness ratings.  These limited main effects of mood group were, however, 
qualified by significant temporal direction x mood group interactions for all variables: 
vividness, F(1,57)=13.72, p<.001; coherence, F(1,57)=15.29, p<.001;  sensory detail, 
F(1,57)=16.03, p<.001; bodily experience, F(1,57)=14.09, p<.001; and emotional 
intensity, F(1,57)=32.44, p<.001.  Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed 
that, with respect to ratings of coherence, bodily experience and emotional intensity, 
dysphoric, compared with non-dysphoric, participants provided higher ratings for past 
events and lower ratings for future events (ps<.05). Ratings of vividness and sensory 
detail did not differ between dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants with respect to 
past events (ps>.05).  However, dysphoric participants provided significantly lower 
ratings for these variables in relation to future events (ps<.05). No other two-way or 
three-way interaction effects were significant (all ps>.12). 
The final two ratings reflected the importance of the events in terms of self-
concept. A significant main effect of temporal direction emerged for both importance 
with respect to life story, F(1,57)=4.89, p<.05, and identity, F(1,57)=4.37, p<.05. In 
both instances, future events were rated as being more important. Significant main 
effect of temporal distance also emerged for both importance to identity, F 
(1,57)=57.18, p<.001, and life story, F(1,57)=123.25, p<.001. Temporally distant, 
compared with near, events were rated as more important with respect to identity and 
life story. There were a significant main effects of mood group for importance for 
identity, F(1,57)=5.03, p<.05, but not life story, F(1,57)=2.59, p=.11. Dysphoric, 
compared with non-dysphoric, participants rated events as less important with respect 
to their identity. Significant temporal direction x mood group interaction effects for 
emerged both variables: life story, F (1,57) = 14.40, p<.001; identity, F (1,57) = 
14.54, p<.001.  Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that whilst 
dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants did not differ on their importance ratings 
with respect to past events (ps>.05), the dysphoric participants rated future events as 
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significantly less important with respect to both identity and life story (ps<.05). No 
other two-way or three-way interaction effects were significant (all ps>.12). 
3.5. Phenomenological Characteristics Ratings – Positive Events Only 
Previous research has evidenced that emotional valence affects other 
subjective qualities of memories, with negative memories being less vivid and 
sensorially detailed (e.g.  D’Argembeau,  Comblain,  &  Van  der  Linden,  2003). Within 
the present dataset the dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants differed with respect 
to the proportion of events that were subjectively rated as being positive in valence.  
Therefore, it is feasible that variations in the subjective characteristics ratings between 
the mood groups may be a function of differences in event valence. Due to the use of 
non-emotional cues for retrieval/simulation, not all participants produced sufficient 
positive, negative and neutral events within each of the temporal distance and 
direction conditions for the emotional valence of events to be entered as a factor 
within the analyses. However, 24 of the non-dysphoric and 25 of the dysphoric 
participants produced sufficient numbers of positive events (rated as +1, +2 or +3 for 
emotional valence) to allow the subjective experience of these events to be examined 
as a function of temporal direction and mood group.  Examining whether dysphoric 
and non-dysphoric individuals differ with respect to their subjective experience of 
positive events, both in the past and the future, is particularly pertinent given that 
previous research suggests that positive future cognitions may be particularly 
problematic for dysphoric and depressed individuals (e.g. Holmes et al., 2008). Data 
was collapsed across the two temporal distance conditions (near and far) as the initial 
analyses of phenomenological characteristics revealed no significant temporal 
distance x mood group interactions.  
An initial 2x2 mixed ANOVA examined the effects of temporal direction and 
mood group on ratings of emotional valence.  A significant main effect of mood 
group was found, F(1,47)=4.08, p<.05. Despite all events being rated as positive, non-
dysphoric participants rated these events as significantly more positive than their 
dysphoric counterparts.  No significant effect of temporal direction, F(1,47)=1.44, 
p=.24, or interaction, F(1,47)=1.00, p=.32, emerged. 
With respect to the ratings relating to the extent and nature of (p)reliving a 
similar, albeit not identical, pattern of findings emerged to those found within the 
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analyses of all events. Significant main effects of temporal direction were evidenced 
for all variables, whereby future, compared with past, events were rated as being less 
vivid, F(1,47)=60.21, p<.001; coherent, F(1,47)=47.46, p<.001, sensorially detailed, 
F(1,47)=42.64, p<.001, bodily experienced, F(1,47)=25.38; p<.001,and emotionally 
intense, F(1,47)=23.50, p<.001. No significant main effects of mood group emerged 
for ratings of coherence, bodily experience or emotional intensity (all ps>.2). A 
significant effect of mood group was evident for ratings of vividness, F(1,47)=4.17, 
p<.05, and sensory detail, F(1,47)=5.57, p<.05. Dysphoric individuals, compared with 
non-dysphoric controls, rated events as being less vivid and rich in sensory detail.  
These limited main effects of mood group were, however, qualified by significant 
temporal direction x mood group interactions for all variables: vividness, 
F(1,47)=15.64, p<.001; coherence, F(1,47)=18.42, p<.001;  sensory detail, 
F(1,57)=12.98, p<.01; bodily experience, F(1,47)=14.94, p<.001; and emotional 
intensity, F(1,47)=23.92, p<.001.  Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed 
that, with respect to ratings of vividness, coherence and sensory detail, dysphoric and 
non-dysphoric participants did not differ with respect to their ratings in relation to 
past events (ps>.05).  However, dysphoric participants rated future events 
significantly lower on all three of these variables (ps<.05).  Ratings of bodily 
experience and emotional intensity were rated by dysphoric, compared with non-
dysphoric, participants as being significantly higher for past positive events and lower 
for future positive events (ps<.05). 
Participants’ assessments of importance of the events in terms of self-concept, 
both in term of identity and life story, revealed no significant main effects of temporal 
direction or mood group. The lack of significant main effects was, however, qualified 
by significant interaction effects for both variables: identity, F(1,47)=11.82, p<.005; 
life story, F(1,47)=9.47, p<.01. In a similar pattern to that evidenced for in the 
analyses of all events, bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that 
dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants did not differ on their importance ratings 
with respect to past events, yet the dysphoric participants rated future events as 
significantly less important with respect to both identity and life story.  
4. Discussion 
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 The current research compared the content and subjective experience of past 
and future episodes in individuals with dysphoria and non-dysphoric controls. It was 
hypothesised that the dysphoric group would generate fewer positive, and more 
negative, events compared with controls.  Independent coding of event content did not 
fully support this hypothesis given that differences only emerged with respect to the 
proportion of negative, but not positive, events. However, subjective ratings of 
emotional valence were fitting with this hypothesis. Taken together these findings are, 
to some extent, in line with previous work evidencing a negativity bias within 
autobiographical thinking in depression (e.g. Lloyd & Lishman, 1975; MacLeod et al., 
1997).  Interestingly, our findings suggest that this negativity bias may not necessarily 
be due to dysphoric individuals generating fewer events that are, by independent 
definition, positive.  Instead, the smaller proportion of events subjectively rated as 
positive suggests that it is the interpretation and experience of emotions 
accompanying recall/simulation that differs in dysphoria. For instance, a dysphoric 
participant could describe a party to celebrate the end of exams, which would be 
independently coded as positive, yet symptoms of depression such as low self-worth 
may mean that they felt socially uncomfortable and, thus, did not rate the event as a 
positive experience.   
 We hypothesised, in line with previous literature evidencing a positivity bias 
with respect to future thinking (e.g.  Berntsen  &  Bohn,  2010;;  D’Argembeau  &  van  der  
Linden, 2004), that future events would be rated as more positive than past events. 
Independent coding, but not subjective ratings, of events supported this hypothesis.  
We were particularly interested to establish whether dysphoric individuals would 
evidence a similar positivity bias for the future. Previous literature made it difficult to 
create a clear prediction; some researchers have shown that depressed individuals 
have particular difficulty with generating positive future cognitions (e.g. Holmes et 
al., 2008) yet other work (e.g. Dalgleish et al., 2011) has found that depressed 
individuals structure the past, but not the future, in a depressogenic manner. No 
significant interaction effects emerged that suggest a different pattern of findings 
within the dysphoric, compared with the control, group. Whilst the dysphoric 
participants reported more negative events across both temporal directions, both 
control and dysphoric participants reported more, independently coded, positive 
events in the future compared with the past.  
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Five of the remaining phenomenological characteristics ratings assessed the 
nature and extent of (p)reliving that accompanied event recall/simulation.  It was 
hypothesised that past, compared with future and temporally near, compared with far, 
events would be rated as having higher levels of (p)reliving.  Furthermore, it was 
predicted that dysphoric, compared with control, participants would report lower 
levels of (p)reliving.  The first of these hypotheses was supported across all variables. 
However, the prediction regarding differences between the dysphoric and control 
participants was, in the main, unsupported.  The only variable for which dysphoric 
participants reported significantly lower ratings was vividness.  These findings were, 
however, qualified by a significant interaction effects, between temporal direction and 
mood group, for all variables.  Dysphoric, compared with control, participants rated 
past events as more coherent, bodily experienced and emotionally intense; they also 
rated them as equally vivid and sensorially detailed as their non-dysphoric 
counterparts.  Conversely, they rated future events as less vivid, coherent, sensorially 
detailed, bodily experienced, and emotionally intense than the non-dysphoric controls.  
Thus, when explicitly emotional cues are not used to elicit memories and simulations 
we were unable to find any evidence of a reduced autonoetic experience with respect 
to memory in dysphoria; however, we found strong evidence that such a bias is 
evident in future thinking. 
Previous literature suggests that emotional valence affects other subjective 
qualities of events (D’Argembeau et al., 2003).  Given that the proportions of 
positive, negative and neutral events differed between our dysphoric and control 
groups, it seems wise to consider whether this may have accounted for the observed 
findings. One possible explanation can be drawn from the fact that depression has 
been particularly associated with problems with positive future cognitions (e.g. 
Holmes et al., 2008; MacLeod et al., 1997).  The majority of events, both past and 
future, were objectively coded as representing positive experiences. Therefore, it is 
fitting that we evidenced muted preliving, but not reliving, within our dataset.  In 
order to test this proposition further we examined whether the same pattern of 
findings was evidence when only events subjectively rated as positive by participants 
were analysed.  The results were largely comparable. Reliving of memories was rated 
equal, or higher, by the dysphoric, compared with the non-dysphoric, group; 
conversely, ratings for preliving were consistently lower.  These findings, therefore, 
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lend further support to the notion that dysphoric individuals have a particular 
difficulty with envisaging positive events in the future.   
The key question raised by the current, and previous, findings is why 
dysphoric individuals struggle to envision future, but not past, events? Depression is 
associated with intrusive memories and prospections (e.g. Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 
1999; Morina et al., 2011).  Thus, attempts by the dysphoric participants to avoid such 
intrusive thoughts leads to competition for limited cognitive resources and results in 
reduced levels of autonoetic consciousness (Lemogne, Bergouignan, Piolino, et al., 
2009).  However, given that depression is associated with both intrusive past and 
future thinking this explanation does not fully account for why the reduction in 
autonoetic consciousness is only evident for future, but not past, events. One clue may 
be provided by the ratings for importance with respect to identity and life story.  The 
non-dysphoric participants demonstrated the same pattern evidenced in previous 
literature, whereby past, compared with future, events involve higher levels of 
autonoetic consciousness and lower levels of importance with respect to identity/life 
story (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010).  Dysphoric participants did not show this pattern; 
they rated future events as significantly less vivid and less important than past events. 
Given that our findings, and those of Watson et al (2012), suggest that depressed 
individuals rate past events as being more important than future events, it logically 
follows that they may assign more cognitive resources to thinking about the past. In 
doing so, they have fewer cognitive resources available for future thinking and, 
therefore, any simulations they generate contain lower levels of autonoetic 
consciousness. The inclusion of measures of intrusive memories and prospections in 
future research would help elucidate on this proposition.  
 What are the implications of these findings? The current data, in line with 
previous research, suggests that individuals with dysphoria have difficulties in 
envisioning positive events in the future.  Furthermore, they struggle to create vivid 
and coherent simulations of future events. Most interestingly, coupled with this 
reduced sense of autonoetic consciousness, they view these future events as lacking in 
importance with respect to their self-narrative. This could have implications for their 
ability to effectively problem solve and plan for the future, as previous research 
suggests that future simulation can promote positive mood, improve motivation and 
increase the likelihood of behavioural enactment ( e.g. Pham & Taylor, 1999; Pictet, 
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Coughtrey, Mathews, & Holmes, 2011). Rasmussen and Berntsen (2013) argue that, 
whilst the past provides important information in terms of learning from mistakes, the 
future is more important with respect to self regulation. Future episodic thinking is 
characterized by uncorrected positive  illusions,  which  motivate  us  ‘to  explore  the  
environment and to set and approach new goals with the expectation that we will 
succeed’  (p.198).  If individuals with dysphoria are focused on a negatively-biased 
past, they may become overly concerned with the avoidance of repeating past 
mistakes yet ignore the importance of generating new goals for the future.   
Furthermore,  if  the  dysphoric  individual’s  self-concept is primarily driven by 
negatively interpreted past events then they may struggle to see how things may alter 
and, as a result, become less motivated to initiate change.  In essence, the past can 
only be reinterpreted, not altered, whereas viewing the future as more important for 
one’s  self-concept has the benefit of allowing for a fluid and changeable self, with the 
possibility of an emergent ideal self in the future. 
 Given the previous literature evidencing overgeneral thinking biases in 
depression (e.g. Dickson & Bates, 2006; Williams & Scott, 1988; Williams et al., 
1996) it was, perhaps, surprising that the dysphoric participants in the current study 
did not demonstrate such a bias. However, Raes, Hermans, Williams and Eelen (2007) 
highlight that the emergence of overgeneral thinking within non-clinical groups 
appears to less consistent and may be dependent upon the cueing methodology 
employed. They argue that when instructions explicitly state that the events 
recalled/simulated must pertain to a single day, as was the case in the present study, 
then overgeneral responses are very low.  Within the current findings it is also 
interesting to note that when non-specific responses were provided they referred to 
extended, rather than categoric, events.  This may, again, be a function of the different 
cueing methodology employed in the current research. The majority of the previous 
literature has relied on emotional cues, which we argue may be more likely to evoke 
avoidant and/or ruminative thinking that, as outlined by the Car-FA-X model 
(Williams, 2006; Williams et al., 2007), results in a truncated search at the level of the 
categoric descriptor.  
 The current findings provide an insight into the differing content and 
subjective experience of past and future events in dysphoria.  Whilst these biases have 
a number of potential implications for adaptive functioning and maintenance of 
depression, we acknowledge a number of limitations and raise questions for future 
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research. Our study explored the subjective experience of past and future episodes in 
dysphoria.  However, it would be of interest to establish whether the same pattern of 
findings extends to individuals with a clinical diagnosis of depression. It would also 
be of interest to include measures of personality assessment in future work. This 
would help to disentangle the effects of transient dysphoric mood and enduring 
negative affectivity, such as neuroticism and harm avoidance (Lemogne, 
Bergouignan, Boni, et al., 2009).   Furthermore, at this stage we do not know whether 
these biases represent a thinking style that emerges as a result of depressive 
symptomatology or whether it constitutes a more stable cognitive style that 
predisposes an individual to developing depression.  
  Our study aimed to move away from the methodology employed in previous 
work that has been heavily reliant on the use of emotionally valenced cues for 
retrieval/simulation in dysphoric individuals. As a result of this we placed minimal 
constraints on the events reported by participants.  A number of studies have, 
however, suggested that the recall and simulation of events differs dependent upon the 
valence of the event (e.g.  D’Argembeau  et  al.,  2003).  Therefore, it would be pertinent 
to incorporate event valence into future work. In order to maintain a minimal cueing 
technique it would be necessary to increase the number of events recalled/simulated; 
this would increase the likelihood of sufficient positive and negative events, allowing 
valence to be entered as an independent factor within the analyses. Answering the 
questions raised here would elucidate further on the biases in content and subjective 
experience of recalled and simulated life events, and their role in maintaining the 
negative thinking that is central to depressive symptomatology. 
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Table 1: Content (independently rated) and valence (subjectively rated) of events as a function of temporal distance, temporal duration and mood group. Figures represent proportion of events with standard deviations in parentheses. (Dysphoric, n=31; Non-dyphoric, n=28) 
 
 
Past 
 
 Future 
Near 
 
 Distant  Near  Distant 
 
Event Content  
 
  
 
Celebrations & 
Leisure Activities 
 
Non-Dysph. 
 
.52 (.32) 
  
.62 (.29) 
  
.48 (.35) 
  
.64 (.33) 
Dysphoric .50 (.34)  .60 (.37)  .60 (.33)  .61 (.36) 
 
Academic & Work 
(Positive)  
Non-Dysph. .11 (.21)  .18 (.24)  .34 (.33)  .34 (.33) 
Dysphoric .08 (.19)  .08 (.19)  .26 (.34)  .34 (.35) 
 
Academic & Work 
(Neutral or Negative)  
Non-Dysph. .11 (.21)  .02 (.09)  .09 (.20)  .00 (.00) 
Dysphoric .19 (.24)  .11 (.21)  .09 (.20)  .03 (.12) 
 
Arguments, 
Accidents & Deaths  
Non-Dysph. .12 (.26)  .11 (.21)  .02 (.09)  .02 (.09) 
Dysphoric .20 (.31)  .11 (.21)  .02 (.09)  .00 (.00) 
 
Other Non-Dysph. .14 (.27)  .07 (.22)  .07 (.18)  .00 (.00) 
Dysphoric .03 (.12)  .03 (.12)  .03 (.12)  .02 (.09) 
 
 
Event Valence  
 
        
Positive Non-Dysph. .63 (.40)  .68 (.37)  .63 (.42)  .77 (.38) 
Dysph. 
 
.37 (.34)  .51 (.40)  .44 (.38)  .41 (.45) 
Negative Non-Dysph. .29 (.40)  .25 (.37)  .30 (.42)  16 (.33) 
Dysph. 
 
.40 (.35)  .39 (.38)  .32 (.30)  .29 (.36) 
Neutral Non-Dysph. .08 (.24)  .07 (.18)  .07 (.18)  .07 (.22) 
Dysph. 
 
.23 (.31)  .10 (.24)  .24 (.34)  .30 (.38)  
Table 1
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Table 2: Mean subjective experience ratings across temporal direction, temporal distance and mood group, with standard deviations in parentheses (Dysphoric, n=31; Non-dysphoric, n=28) 
 
 
Past 
 
 Future ANOVA 
Near 
 
 Distant  Near  Distant Main Effects  
 
Interactions 
 
Vividness 
 
Non-Dysph. 
 
5.88 (0.88) 
  
4.98 (1.46) 
  
4.66 (1.32) 
  
4.46 (1.55) 
 
Past>Future 
Near>Distant 
Non-Dys.>Dys.  
 
 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.=Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
Dysphoric 6.19 (0.89)  5.10 (1.28)  3.79 (1.41)  2.89 (1.49) 
 
Coherence Non-Dysph. 5.94 (1.07)  4.88 (1.49)  4.73 (1.30)  4.27 (1.72) Past>Future 
Near>Distant 
 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.>Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
 
Dysphoric 6.39 (1.05)  5.48 (1.57)  3.82 (1.54)  3.10 (1.46) 
 
Sensory 
Detail 
Non-Dysph. 4.59 (1.58)  4.00 (1.71)  4.38 (1.36)  3.68 (1.65) Past>Future 
Near>Distant 
 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.=Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
 
Dysphoric 5.15 (1.12)  4.73 (1.82)  3.13 (1.59)  2.61 (1.47) 
 
Bodily 
Experience 
Non-Dysph. 4.80 (1.65)  4.21 (1.66)  4.38 (1.73)  4.04 (1.85) Past>Future 
 
 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.>Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
 
Dysphoric 6.00 (1.32)  5.42 (1.57)  3.61 (1.65)  3.20 (1.65) 
 
Emotional 
Intensity 
Non-Dysph. 4.89 (1.84)  3.89 (1.77)  4.64 (1.76)  4.55 (1.70) Past>Future 
 
 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.>Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
 
Dysphoric 5.63 (1.26)  5.45 (1.32)  3.69 (1.69)  3.18 (1.71) 
 
Identity Non-Dysph. 2.80 (1.30)  4.21 (1.88)  4.54 (1.42)  5.23 (1.36) Future>Past 
Distant>Near 
Non-Dys.>Dys. 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.=Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
 
Dysphoric 2.68 (1.05)  4.53 (1.75)  2.81 (1.71)  3.74 (2.03) 
 
Life Story Non-Dysph. 2.16 (1.62)  3.77 (1.85)  3.48 (1.65)  5.54 (1.17) Future>Past 
Distant>Past 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.=Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
 
Dysphoric 2.45 (1.45)  4.55 (1.71)  2.56 (1.57)  4.02 (1.91) 
  
Table 2
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Table 3: Mean subjective experience ratings for positive events across temporal direction, temporal distance and mood group, with standard deviations in parentheses (Dysphoric, n=25; Non-dysphoric, n=24) 
 
 
   ANOVA 
Past  Future Main Effects  
 
Interactions 
 
Vividness 
 
Non-Dysph. 
 
5.38 (1.12) 
  
4.53 (1.22) 
 
Past>Future 
Non-Dys.>Dys.  
 
 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.=Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
 
Dysphoric 
 
 
5.69 (1.40) 
  
3.10 (1.16) 
Coherence Non-Dysph. 5.18 (1.33) 
 
 4.50 (1.31) Past>Future 
 
 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.=Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
 
Dysphoric 5.93 (1.48) 
 
 3.03 (1.18) 
 
Sensory 
Detail 
Non-Dysph. 4.67 (1.46) 
 
 3.99 (1.34) Past>Future 
Non-Dys.>Dys. 
 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.=Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
 
Dysphoric 4.81 (1.35) 
 
  2.47 (1.02) 
 
Bodily 
Experience 
Non-Dysph. 4.56 (1.45) 
 
 4.23 (1.63) Past>Future 
 
 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.>Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
 
Dysphoric 5.44 (1.46) 
 
 2.96 (1.38) 
 
Emotional 
Intensity 
Non-Dysph. 4.48 (1.32) 
 
 4.49 (1.61) Past>Future 
 
 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.>Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
 
Dysphoric 5.39 (1.21) 
 
 3.04 (1.44) 
 
Identity Non-Dysph. 3.20 (1.41) 
 
 4.56 (1.30)  
 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.=Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
 
Dysphoric 3.55 (1.76) 
 
 3.12 (1.65) 
 
Life Story Non-Dysph. 3.16 (1.54) 
 
 4.51 (1.35)  
 
Temp Dir x Mood Group 
(Dys.=Non-Dys. in past & 
Dys.<Non-Dys. in future) 
 
Dysphoric 3.63 (1.83) 
 
 3.12 (1.73) 
  
Table 3
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